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Scientific Objectivity and its Limits
1. Introduction
Measurement outcomes provide data for a physical theory. Unless they are objective they support 
no objective scientific knowledge. So the outcome of a quantum measurement must be an 
objective physical fact. But recent arguments1 purport to show that if quantum theory is 
universally applicable then there is no such fact. This calls for a reappraisal of the notions of fact 
and objectivity. If quantum theory is universally applicable the facts about the physical world 
include a fact about each quantum measurement outcome. These physical facts lack an ideal kind 
of objectivity but their more modest objectivity is all that science needs. 
Section 1 outlines one argument based on Leegwater=s (2018) analysis of a 
gedankenexperiment. It shows how the assumption that quantum theory is universally applicable 
leads to the paradoxical conclusion that not every quantum measurement in this scenario can 
have a unique physical outcome. Section 3 clarifies the nature of this paradox and analyzes the 
key assumptions that lead to it. Section 4 considers attempts to resolve the paradox by appeal to 
the contextuality of sentences purporting to state facts about unique measurement outcomes. 
Appeals to contextuality of use fail to do so, but if the content of a sentence depends on the 
context at which it is assessed then the paradox may be avoided. Section 5 raises and answers the 
question as to why these sentences are assessable for truth or falsity only at an appropriate 
context. A sentence used in one context is assessable at another context only insofar as quantum 
theory can be applied at both contexts at once so as to link these in a wider context. Section 6 
applies and extends Huw Price=s (1988) work on the notions of fact and truth to say how these 
notions may be limited in application by physical limits to communication while continuing to 
serve the functions that explain why we have them. I conclude by applying the lessons of the 
paradox to the world as it isCa world in which realizing the paradoxical scenario will forever 
remain beyond the powers of any agents. The paradox shows that in our quantum world there are 
no transcendently objective facts about the outcomes of quantum measurementsCnor indeed 
about the values of electric currents, nor even about the position of the apparatus in the 
laboratory. But these are immanently objective factsCfacts expressed by sentences used to 
express truths when assessed in all actual contexts. Such facts provide all the objective data we 
need, both as scientists and as others who rely on the objectivity of the knowledge they support. 
2. The Paradoxical Scenario
1 Including those in Bong et al. (2020), Brukner (2017, 2018, 2020), Cavalcanti (2020), Frauchiger and Renner 
(2018), Healey (2018), Leegwater (2018). 
To present the problem which is central to the argument of this paper I need to describe a 
hypothetical physical scenario to show that certain otherwise plausible assumptions lead to a 
paradox when applied in that scenario. Realizing such a scenario lies far beyond the capabilities 
of current science for reasons I shall explain later. But it is the track record of a wide variety of 
successful applications of current science in realizable scenarios that makes each of these 
assumptions plausible, both individually and collectively. 
Each paradoxical hypothetical scenario involves the performance of measurements on 
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physical systems assigned quantum states. Here I show how the paradox arises in a 
Gedankenexperiment involving a triple of quantum systems (spin 2 atoms) initially assigned an 
entangled GHZ state. In this scenario measurements are made not only on these systems but also 
on entire isolated laboratories in which measurements are made on them. To my knowledge it 
was Wigner (1961) who first considered the possibility of performing a quantum measurement 
on an entire isolated laboratory containing his friend, so the hypothetical scenario I shall describe 
may be thought of as one in which Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger meet Wigner=s friendCthe 
title of a preprint by Leegwater (2018) on which I will draw freely, especially in this section. 
 
2.1 The scenario of Wigner=s Friend 
Wigner (1961) considered a hypothetical scenario in which his friend (whom I will call Alice) is 
confined to a physically isolated laboratory while performing a quantum measurement on a 
system (I=ll take this to be of the z-spin of a spin 2 atom initially assigned a spin-up quantum 
state of x-spin). Applying the Born rule of quantum theory in her laboratory, Alice should expect 
a unique outcome of either z-spin up or z-spin down, each with probability 2. Eugene remains 
outside the laboratory and initially does not interact with it. Assuming that quantum theory is 
applicable to any isolated system no matter how large or complex, Wigner (and his namesake 
Eugene) assigns a quantum state to the entire contents of Alice=s laboratory (including her body 
as well as the atom and all her measuring and recording apparatus). He further assumes that this 
state evolves unitarily during Alice=s measurement since her laboratory then remains isolated. At 
the end of Alice=s measurement this state will therefore be an entangled superposition, one 
component of which may be thought to correspond to Alice=s outcome up (as observed by Alice 
and multiply recorded in her laboratory) while the other corresponds to Alice=s outcome down (as 
observed by Alice and multiply recorded in her laboratory). Taking this correspondence to falsely 
imply that Alice=s measurement failed to have an outcome (unique or otherwise), Wigner himself 
concluded that unitary quantum theory is not applicable to a system that includes a conscious 
observer: that Alice=s conscious observation produced the unique outcome she recorded, thereby 
physically Acollapsing@ the quantum stateCnot only of the atom but also of her entire laboratory. 
Already we see in this scenario the tension between the assumption that unitary quantum 
theory is applicable to any isolated system and the assumption that every (competent) quantum 
measurement has a unique outcome. But the tension may be relieved in this case if one rejects the 
inference from assignment of the superposed state to denial that there has been a unique 
outcome. Assigning the superposed state to her laboratory, Eugene can consistently maintain that 
Alice=s measurement has had a unique outcome even before he breaks the isolation by opening 
the door to have a look for himself. Insisting on a unique outcome even in such a superposed 
state is not an ad hoc move for anyone who thinks of a quantum state as merely a book-keeping 
device to be used to keep track of one=s rational expectations concerning the possible outcomes 
of measurements that might be performed on the system to which it is assigned. That is roughly 
what Schrödinger (1935), QBists (Fuchs, Mermin and Schack, 2014) and pragmatists (Healey, 
2017), along with many others, take to be the constitutive function of the quantum state. By 
itself, the scenario of Wigner=s friend gives rise to no paradox. 
 
2.2 The scenario of Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger 
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One consequence of Bell=s theorem (1964, 2004) is that the probabilistic predictions of any local 
hidden variable theory are inconsistent with those of quantum theory in certain circumstances. 
The quantum predictions have now been thoroughly verified in a wide range of such 
circumstances. Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger (1990) presented an argument extending Bell=s 
theorem to a situation involving only extremal (0 or 1) probabilistic predictions. For this purpose 
they considered an entangled state of three quantum systems now known as a GHZ state. To 
explain their argument I shall consider a scenario involving a GHZ state of three spin 2 atoms 
(see equation (13) of Leegwater (2018)).  
The Born rule predicts that this state has a number of interesting properties: 
(1) If the y-spin of each atom is measured simultaneously the outcome will (with probability 1) 
be either all spin up or all spin down, and each outcome is equally likely (probability 2). 
(2) If the x-spin of each atom is measured simultaneously there are four possible (non-zero 
probability) outcomes; but in each case if we assign +1 to a spin up outcome and -1 to a spin 
down outcome then the product of these three numbers will (with probability 1) be -1. 
(3) If the x-spin of one atom is measured simultaneously with measurements of the z-spins of the 
other two atoms there are four possible (non-zero probability) outcomes; and if up/down 
outcomes are assigned +1/-1 in the same way as in (2), then the product of these three numbers 
will (with probability 1) be +1. 
Suppose that a measurement of a component of spin merely reveals whether that 
component had spin up or down at the time it was measured. Then we can assign numbers to 
these properties just as we assigned numbers to the outcomes of a corresponding spin 
measurement. Let a, b, c number whether the x-spin of the first, second, third atom was up or 
down; and let u, v, w number whether the z-spin of the first, second, third atom was up or down. 
Then (2) implies that a.b.c = -1, while (3) implies that 
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Multiplying these last three equations together it follows that a.b.c = +1, in contradiction to what 
(2) implied. So, with probability 1, the Born probabilities predicted by the GHZ state are 
incompatible with the assumption that each measurement merely revealed the value of the 
measured spin-component. Experiments have verified the Born probabilities for similar GHZ 
states (Pan et al., 2000). 
 
2.3 Wigner’s Friend meets GHZ 
Though striking, neither of the scenarios described so far is paradoxical. Analogous GHZ 
scenarios have been realized experimentally and the quantum predictions verified. The scenario 
of Wigner’s friend would be difficult if not impossible to realize experimentally because of the 
requirement of isolation. But the point is that whether or not it can be physically realized, each of 
these scenarios may be rendered compatible with the assumptions that unitary quantum theory is 
universally applicable to isolated systems and that every quantum measurement has a unique 
outcome. We arrive at a paradox only by suitably combining these scenarios into a third, more 
complex scenario. 
 The idea is to substitute the assumed outcomes of actual quantum measurements for the 
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hidden states assumed in the GHZ scenario. These will be quantum measurements on three spin 
½ atoms assigned a GHZ state, and they will be performed in three mutually isolated 
laboratories. Each laboratory will be assumed also to be isolated from everything else except 
during the performance of a measurement on that laboratory. This last measurement will be 
analogous to a measurement Eugene might have performed to verify the quantum state he has 
assigned to his friend’s lab and its contents in the scenario of §2.1. 
 So consider three experimenters Alice, Bob and Charlie, each confined to a physically 
isolated laboratory to perform one measurement of spin component on a single spin ½ atom. 
Assume that these three atoms are assigned the GHZ state for which the Born rule correctly 
predicts probabilities satisfying conditions (1)-(3) specified in the previous subsection. Note that 
those conditions concerned simultaneous measurements. In the combined scenario of this 
subsection it will be important to be explicit about what that means, since the scenario will be set 
in a relativistic spacetime that is assumed to have the structure of Minkowski spacetime, at least 
in the region where the scenario unfolds. The laboratories of Alice, Bob and Charlie are all 
stationary in a single inertial frame Σ, and they perform their measurements simultaneously in 
that frame. 
 The assumption that unitary quantum theory is universally applicable is taken here to 
imply that the Born rule may be applied to a set of (mutually compatible) measurements that are 
simultaneous in any inertial frame. Since any actual measurement takes time, we further assume 
that measurements on distant systems or laboratories are simultaneous in a frame just in case they 
begin and end at the same time in that frame. Eugene, Johnny and Daniel also remain stationary 
in frame Σ while still able to perform certain measurements on these laboratories. Eugene 
performs a measurement on Alice’s laboratory, Johnny performs an analogous measurement on 
Bob’s laboratory, and Daniel performs an analogous measurement on Charlie’s laboratory. These 
three measurements also occur simultaneously in Σ. 
 The assumption that a quantum measurement has a unique outcome may now be stated a 
little more precisely, following Leegwater (2018)2: 
 
Single Outcomes: Any quantum measurement has only one single outcome. This outcome is 
independent of the frame in which the outcome is described. 
 
This assumption applies to each of the six measurements performed in this combined scenario by 
Alice, Bob, Charlie, Eugene, Johnny and Daniel respectively. But it will turn out that after all 
these measurements have been completed the only surviving records are of the outcomes of the 
measurements by Eugene, Johnny and Daniel. 
 Between t0 and t1 in Σ each of Alice, Bob and Charlie measures the z-component of spin 
of the atom in his or her laboratory and records its unique outcome inside the laboratory but 
without breaking isolation by communicating this outcome outside. Eugene, Johnny and Daniel 
make their measurements between t1 and t2 in Σ. Eugene measures a complicated observable 
magnitude XA on Alice’s laboratory L together with the spin ½ atom she has measured. Johnny 
(Daniel) measures the analogous magnitude XB (XC) on the laboratory M (N) together with the 
                                                 
2 Leegwater also requires the outcome to be independent of perspective, but he does not say what that is or how it 
differs from a frame. This will prove significant later. 
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spin ½ atom it contains. An X-magnitude is the analog in the argument based on this scenario of 
x-spin in the GHZ scenario. But, unlike the x-spin of an atom, it would be extraordinarily 
difficult to measure an X-magnitude: it may be thought of as encoding detailed correlations 
between the atom and the atomic structure of the laboratory that contains it. 
 Assuming that L, M, N are far enough apart in Σ there will be an inertial frame Σʹ in 
which the measurements by Bob and Charlie between t1ʹ and t2ʹ are simultaneous with Eugene’s 
but after Alice’s. The quantum state assigned at the tʹ time just prior to these simultaneous 
measurements will be an analog3 of the state in the original GHZ scenario that implied an 
instance of condition (3). We can number the possible outcomes of Eugene’s, Bob’s and 
Charlie’s simultaneous measurements, each with +1 or -1 as before. Let Bob, Charlie’s and 
Eugene’s outcomes be numbered b, c, u respectively. Then the analog to condition (3) implies in 
this case that u.b.c = +1. 
 There will be another inertial frame Σ ʺ in which it is not Bob’s but Johnny’s 
measurement that is simultaneous with those of Alice and Charlie. Numbering Johnny’s outcome 
v the analog to condition (3) implies that a.v.c = +1. Finally it is Daniel’s not Charlie’s 
measurement that is simultaneous with Alice’s and Bob’s in Σ ʹʹʹ, from which we infer that a.b.w 
= +1, where w numbers Daniel’s outcome. Putting these equations together we have 
u b c
a v c
a b w
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But Eugene, Johnny and Daniel each measured an X-magnitude of a laboratory plus atom 
simultaneously in Σ when the quantum state of the laboratories plus atoms paralleled the GHZ 
state of three atoms but with XA, XB, XC in place of the x-spins of the atoms in laboratories L, M, 
N. Just as we saw in the previous subsection that the product of the outcome numbers a, b, c for 
measurements of x-spin must (with probability 1) be -1 in the GHZ state, so here the product of 
the outcome numbers u, v, w for measurements of XA, XB , XC respectively must (with probability 
1) be -1, so u.v.w. = -1.4 This is inconsistent with the previous three equations, as can be readily 
seen by multiplying them together to get u.v.w. = +1. 
 It is important to note two things about the contradiction at which we have arrived in this 
combined scenario. Unlike in the original GHZ scenario, each of a,b,c,u,v,w numbers the single 
outcome of one quantum measurement actually recorded in this combined scenario: the scenario 
does not involve a sequence of repeated measurements of the same kind on similar systems, and 
nor does it involve any merely possible measurements. But repeated application of the Born rule 
in different frames assigns probability zero to every set of six numbers representing the outcomes 
of those six measurements. While a probability 0 event may occur in an infinite event space (an 
infinitely thin dart may hit some point on a dartboard even though for each point there is zero 
probability of it’s hitting at that point), the event space here is finite. The combined scenario 
presents us with a genuine paradox because here the assumption of single outcomes is 
incompatible with the universal applicability of unitary quantum theory to isolated quantum 
                                                 
3 As Leegwater (2018) notes, the relativistic transformation from Σ to Σʹ here also requires a unitary transformation 
in the state. 
4 Leegwater (2018) has a.b.c. = -1, which I consider a small slip or notational error. 
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systems (including the Born rule as applied in any frame). 
 
3. Analyzing the Paradox 
A set of plausible assumptions cannot all be taken to be true when applied in the scenario of 
§2.3.The paradox arises from the tension between two broad assumptions: that there is a fact 
about the outcome of every (competent) quantum measurement and that quantum theory is 
universally applicable. But the exact content of each of these assumptions requires further 
clarification. I will start with the second. 
 I will take it that quantum theory is universally applicable only if the evolution of a 
quantum state is always unitary.5 But that holds only while the system to which the theory is 
applied is isolated, as Wigner initially assumed when applying quantum theory to the entire 
laboratory in which his friend performed a measurement. But Wigner later reject the assumption 
because he believed it conflicted with there being a fact about the outcome of that measurement. 
I take this requirement of unitary evolution to hold in any special relativistic inertial frame when 
quantum theory is applied in Minkowski spacetime. 
 I will take it that a system remains isolated as long as it is not interacting with any other 
system, where the presence of an interaction would require the introduction of an interaction term 
in the Hamiltonian when quantum theory is applied to a supersystem of which that system forms 
a part. Such isolation need involve neither spatial distancing nor sealing off with barriers. 
  The quantum state of an isolated system is required to hold even for laboratories 
including conscious experimenters and any system on which they perform a quantum 
measurement and record the outcome. And it is assumed to hold despite an experimenter’s 
reassignment of a “collapsed” quantum state to a system on which she has performed a quantum 
measurement within her isolated laboratory. 
 The universal applicability of quantum theory is here assumed to imply that the Born rule 
may be applied to each of the six measurements involved in the scenario of §2.3. It is further 
assumed that the Born rule may be applied to the joint measurements of triples of compatible 
magnitudes as described in that scenario, when those measurements are simultaneous at a time in 
the frame at which their instantaneous quantum state is assigned. The universal applicability of 
the Born rule is assumed finally to imply that each application of the Born rule yields the correct 
probabilities for the events to which it is applied, including in particular the measurement events 
specified in §2.3. 
 The second broad assumption that led to paradox was that there is a fact about the 
outcome of every quantum measurement. Now every experimenter knows that some 
measurements fail to yield an outcome because something goes wrong: the detector is inefficient, 
the apparatus is disturbed, the power goes out, ... . This assumption needs to abstract from such 
real-life messiness without any apparently circular appeal to a quantum measurement’s success. 
This may be done by appeal to a quantum model of a quantum measurement on a target system 
as an interaction between that system and an apparatus. I will assume that all measurements in 
the paradoxical scenario are ideal Von Neuman measurements involving interactions that 
perfectly correlate initial eigenstates of the measured observable with final eigenstates of the 
                                                 
5 This is the Schrödinger picture state. In the Heisenberg picture it is observables that are required to evolve 
unitarily, while both evolve unitarily in other pictures. 
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corresponding apparatus system while leaving the initial system eigenstate unchanged. Consistent 
with the universal applicability of quantum theory, this permits a formulation of the assumption 
that there is a fact about the outcome of a quantum measurement (so modeled) with no 
appearance of circularity. 
 Applied to an initial superposed system state, an ideal Von Neumann measurement yields 
a final superposed quantum state not associated with the apparatus system’s “pointer” indicating 
any particular value of the measured magnitude. That is how the quantum measurement problem 
arises here. But there is no problem if this association does not represent the condition of the 
systems assigned that state. The final (superposed) quantum state of target system and apparatus 
has no such representational role if a quantum state always functions merely as a catalog of 
expectations for possible outcomes of any measurement on the system to which it is assigned—in 
this case, on the apparatus and target system. It was by understanding its role this way that the 
Wigner’s friend scenario was freed from paradox in §2.1. Understood this way, a quantum state 
is associated not with values of magnitudes of the system to which it is assigned, but with the 
possible values magnitudes of this or other systems may take on as a result of a suitable 
interaction, importantly including measurement interactions. 
 If quantum theory is universally applicable then it may be applied in the scenario of §2.3 
in which all six measurements there described are assumed to be modeled as ideal von Neumann 
measurements. Alice, Bob and Charlie each measure the z-component of spin of a spin ½ atom: 
Eugene, Johnny and Daniel each measure an X-magnitude on a composite system of which one 
component is a spin ½ atom and the other is an entire laboratory in which the z-component of 
that atom has just been measured. The second broad assumption implies that there is a fact about 
the outcome of each of these quantum measurements. How may these facts be stated? 
 The following sentence concerns the outcome of Alice’s measurement: 
(A) The outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement at t1 is spin up. 
(A) is true if the outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement at t1 is spin up. (A) is false if the 
outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement at t1 is spin down, in which case (A)ʹ is true: 
(A)ʹ The outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement at t1 is spin down. 
To say that there is fact about the outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement is to say that either (A) 
or (A)ʹ is true but not both. I will understand the occurrence of the word ‘is’ in (A) and (A)ʹ as 
tenseless: the sentence itself specifies the time of the outcome in Σ. In a suitable idealization the 
outcome may be localized to a spacetime point that may be assigned a time in any frame relevant 
to the scenario of §2.3. Just after that time Alice or one of her lab assistants may have used (A) or 
its contrary (A)ʹ to express the fact that the measurement has a unique outcome and say what it 
was. 
 I follow Leegwater (2018) in assuming that there is a fact about the outcome of a 
quantum measurement only if the existence and character of that outcome is in no way relative to 
inertial frame. The outcome is recorded in the physical condition of a variety of objects in her 
laboratory (“where the pointer points”, what is stored on her computer’s hard drive, what is 
written in her notebook...). While the description of a piece of recording equipment may be 
frame-relative, in each frame this condition serves to record the same outcome. 
 (A) and (A)ʹ have obvious analogs in sentences (B), (B)ʹ; (C), (C)ʹ Bob, Charlie 
respectively may use in his laboratory to state and characterize the fact that his z-spin 
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measurement has an outcome. Eugene can use either of (U) or (U)ʹ to state and characterize the 
fact that his XA-measurement had an outcome: 
 (U) The outcome of Eugene’s XA-measurement at t2 is +1. 
 (U)ʹ The outcome of Eugene’s XA-measurement t2 is -1. 
(V), (V)ʹ; (W), (W)ʹ are analogous sentences for Johnny, Daniel respectively. 
 The assumption that there is a fact about the outcome of each of these six quantum 
measurements then implies that exactly one of the 64 sentences of the form 
(S) A*& B*&C*&U*&V*&W* 
truly states that all six measurements have (these particular) outcomes, where (for example) A* is 
either (A) or (A)ʹ. Moreover, this is a fact only if the truth of that sentence is not relative to 
inertial frame. Here each conjunct of (S) is understood to be used in the laboratory where, and 
just after, the relevant outcome occurred. 
 A paradox arises in the scenario of  §2.3 because applications of the Born rule to certain 
triples of measurements in a frame in which these are simultaneous imply that there is zero 
probability that any of the 64 sentences of the form (S) is true, and probability 1 that each is false. 
But there is a fact about the outcome of each of these six measurements only if exactly one of 
these 64 sentences is true. What kind of paradox is this? 
 A logical paradox occurs when a set of independently plausible assumptions implies a 
contradiction. We have arrived such a situation here only if the occurrence of a probability zero 
event in a finite event space implies a contradiction. The occurrence of such an event is often 
said to be impossible. But a contradiction arises only if we add the further assumption that a 
probability zero event does not occur, at least in this case. Is the occurrence of an event here 
consistent with it’s having probability zero? 
 This would be inconsistent if probability were a quasi-logical concept, as some (including 
Keynes (1921)) have taken it to be. If probability is viewed as a kind of graded implication 
relation between premises and conclusion then probability 1 would correspond to logical 
implication, and probability 0 to logical inconsistency. And if probability were a kind of graded 
disposition—a propensity—then a probability of 1 or 0 would correspond to a sure-fire 
disposition, implying the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event. But neither of these views of 
probability seems adequate to the case of Born probabilities, and neither is accepted by 
proponents of the views of quantum theory mentioned in §2.1. 
 Such views take probability assignments to have an epistemic rather than a logical or 
metaphysical function. Some take a Born probability as a measure of an agent’s actual coherent 
degree of belief, while others hold it up as a normative standard to which the degrees of belief of 
any agent who accepts quantum theory should conform. This distinction does not matter for 
present purposes, since they all take the paradox arising from the scenario of §2.3 to be 
epistemic. Anyone who accepts the Born probabilities of that scenario should be certain that 
every sentence of the form (S) is false, while if he believes that there is a fact about the unique 
outcome of every quantum measurement then he should also be certain that exactly one such 
sentence is true. 
 
4. Contextuality 
Suppose a declarative sentence like (A) expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement were 
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contextual because what statement it expresses is implicitly indexed to its context of use. Then it 
may express a true statement when used in Alice’s laboratory just after her measurement but a 
false statement when used in other contexts. Assume the same holds for each of the other eleven 
similar sentences that may be used to express the outcome of a quantum measurement in the 
scenario of §2.3. The paradox might then be resolved if, for each conjunct of a sentence of the 
form (S), there is a context in which the statement expressed by using a sentence of that form is 
true, while in no context can their conjunction be used to make a true statement. 
 (A) is not explicitly contextual because it contains no indexicals such as ‘I’, ‘now’ or 
‘here’. Is it nevertheless use-contextual because its content depends implicitly on the context in 
which it is used? To resolve the paradox by appeal to such implicit use-contextuality one would 
have to parametrize contexts of use so that (A) may express a truth when used in Alice’s lab just 
after her measurement but a false statement when used in some other relevant context. Contexts 
of use have been parametrized (by Kaplan (1989) and others) as (t, s, p, w), where t indicates the 
time and s the place of use by person p in world w. Variation in none of these parameters 
generates a context of use in which (A) makes a false statement, if (A) expresses a true statement 
when used in Alice’s lab just after her measurement. Variation in w is irrelevant because the 
paradox is set in a single world w, assumed to be possible consistent with the universal 
applicability of quantum theory. Alice’s lab assistant states the same truth as Alice when using 
(A) in the same circumstances, so variation in p would not yield a false statement. Like all the 
other 11 sentences describing the outcome of a quantum measurement in this scenario, (A) itself 
specifies both the laboratory in which that outcome occurs and the time at which it occurs. There 
is no reason to suppose that any of these sentences expresses a statement with a different truth-
value when used at different times or in different places. In the absence of any further relevant 
parameters marking a context of use, appeal to the use-contextuality of sentences like (A) fails to 
resolve the paradox. 
 To resolve the paradox we need to appeal to a further kind of context—a context which 
(following MacFarlane, 2014) I call a context of assessment. MacFarlane’s motive for 
introducing contexts of assessment is very different from mine. He uses them as part of a 
semantic proposal for a natural language like English that would make room for truth-
relativism—the possibility that a sentence used to make a statement with fixed content may be 
correctly assessed as true in one context but false in another. No friend of scientific truth-
relativism, I will use contexts of assessments first to resolve the paradox of §2.3 and then to 
explore the consequent limits of scientific objectivity. The key idea will be that a statement 
assessed as true at one context cannot be assessed as true or as false at some other context. 
 I will take a context of assessment to involve a certain kind of spacetime region such as 
the regions in which measurements occur in the paradoxical scenario. I will call this context of 
assessment the environment of such measurements. It will take some time to say just what kind 
of environment this is. But notice already that this context of assessment requires no 
specification of any person pʹ (such as Alice) or world wʹdistinct from the world in which 
measurements are made, in the paradoxical scenario or elsewhere. 
 At least in the paradoxical scenario, every application of quantum theory is to a system or 
systems in a particular environment. As is now recognized by a range of views on how the theory 
is best understood, the prerequisite for any legitimate application of quantum theory’s 
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probabilistic algorithm is that a system’s quantum state should be robustly decohered through a 
process in which the system interacts with other systems in its environment. I will say that a 
quantum event occurs when a system’s magnitude takes on a value in its environment. A 
necessary condition for the occurrence of a quantum event involving a system is that there be a 
process in the system’s environment that can be modeled by the robust decoherence of states in a 
system’s “pointer basis”, each associated with a different value of that magnitude. This is not a 
sufficient condition. Quantum theory itself cannot explain the event in which the magnitude takes 
on one rather than another value insofar as a quantum state is not applied to represent the 
physical condition or behavior of the system to which it is assigned: its primary function is to 
yield probabilistic predictions in that application. But quantum events are observed to occur, and 
application of the Born rule correctly predicts the probability for a magnitude to take on one 
value rather than another when one does. 
  An interaction suitable to function as a quantum measurement may (and very often does) 
have a unique outcome in an environment outside any laboratory, with no agent present to 
become aware of this fact. All that is required is for a quantum model of the interaction to imply 
robust decoherence of system states in some “pointer basis”. In a measurement, a quantum event 
occurs when and where a corresponding magnitude of this system takes on a value. The outcome 
o of a quantum measurement is typically indicated by the occurrence of many separate such 
quantum events in different systems, but we can count their fusion also as the single composite 
quantum event o that occurs in the spacetime region they collectively occupy. 
 An M-decoherence environment E of a quantum event e in which magnitude M  takes on 
a value in a system is a region of spacetime RE that includes the region where e occurs, together 
with physical processes in RE that can be modeled by robust decoherence of that system’s states 
in a “pointer basis” associated with different values of M. I will call these processes the M-
decoherence processes of the system in environment E. A decoherence environment is an M-
decoherence environment for some magnitude and system. A decoherence environment F 
compatibly extends a decoherence environment E if and only if F includes all the M-decoherence 
processes of systems in E (so E compatibly extends itself). Two decoherence environments are 
distinct just in case no process in the region of one also occurs in the other: they are mutually 
isolated if and only if they are distinct and there is no interaction between any process in E and 
any process in F. A decoherence environment is isolated if and only if it is mutually isolated 
from all distinct decoherence environments. Note that decoherence environments E, F may be 
mutually isolated if RE∩RF≠∅, or even if RE=RF. 
 A context of assessment for each of the twelve sentences purporting to state the unique 
outcome o of a quantum measurement in the paradoxical scenario of §2.3 is a decoherence 
environment E. E is a decoherence environment for which o occurs in RE if and only if E is an M-
decoherence environment for every magnitude M that takes on a value in a quantum event in o. 
The interior of Alice’s laboratory throughout her z-spin measurement occupies the region RA of 
the primary context of assessment EA for a sentence (A): (A) is assessed as true at EA if Alice’s 
outcome is spin up, but false if it is spin down. Each of the other twelve sentences that figure in 
the paradoxical scenario of §2.3 may be assessed in its own primary context of assessment. 
 Since RA, RB are spacelike separated there can be no interaction between a process in RA 
and a process in RB: so EA, EB are mutually isolated. But there is a wider context of assessment 
 
 11 
EAB in region RA∪RB that is a compatible extension both of EA and of EB. The Born rule may be 
applied to joint z-spin measurements in RA∪RB, so each of (A), (B) may be assessed as true or as 
false at EAB. Analogously, RC is spacelike separated from RA, RB, so there is a context of 
assessment EABC in RA∪RB∪RC that compatibly extends EAB and EC at which (A), (B), (C) may 
each be assessed for truth-value. Eugene’s measurement also occurs at spacelike separation from 
those of Bob and Charlie, and there is a context of assessment EUBC for (U), (B), (C) that 
compatibly extends all of EU, EB, EC. But there is no context of assessment at which each of (A), 
(B), (C), (U) may be assessed for truth-value, because no context of assessment compatibly 
extends all of EA, EB, EC, EU. 
 In the paradoxical scenario of section 2 there are five contexts of assessment EABC , EABW , 
EAVC , EUBC , EUVW , each of which compatibly extends the primary context of assessment for 
three of the measurements in that scenario. But there is no compatible extension of more than 
three of these primary contexts, and certainly no compatible extension of all six of them. It 
follows that no sentence of the form (S) can be assessed as true or as false at any context of 
assessment that compatibly extends the primary context of assessment for each of its conjuncts.  
 An experimenter in each laboratory does assess the corresponding conjunct for truth or 
falsity by recording the outcome of the measurement in that laboratory. For example, there is a 
fact about the outcome of Alice’s z-spin measurement if and only if (A) or (A)ʹ is true but not 
both: and Alice assesses the truth-value of (A) in context EA. Leegwater required a unique 
outcome of a quantum measurement to be independent of perspective. This can now be 
understood to require that Alice’s measurement has a unique outcome only if (A) has the same 
truth-value not only in the perspective provided by context EA but also in the perspectives 
provided by its compatible extensions EABC , EABW , EAVC: that (B) has the same truth-value in the 
perspective of context EB as in those of its compatible extensions EABC , EABW , EUBC: that (C) has 
the same truth-value in the perspective of EC as in those of EABC , EAVC , EUBC: that (U) has the 
same truth-value in EU as in EUBC and in EUVW: that (V) has the same truth-value in EV as in EAVC 
and EUVW : and that (W) has the same truth-value in EW as in  EABW and EUVW. But the paradox 
shows that it is irrational to believe these conditions can all be satisfied at once. 
 
5. Limits on assessment 
If unitary quantum theory is universally applicable, then there is no perspective-independent fact 
about the outcome of each of the six measurements performed in the paradoxical scenario of 
§2.3. This is true even if the only available perspectives are those provided by compatible 
extensions of a primary context of assessment for those outcomes. But in this scenario there are 
contexts of assessment such as EU for a sentence like (A) that do not compatibly extend its 
primary context of assessment. For there to be a perspective-independent fact about the unique 
outcome of Alice’s quantum measurement should (A) not receive the same truth-value in EU as in 
EA? Why should contexts of assessment be restricted to decoherence environments in the first 
place: does a region of spacetime in which no decoherence processes occur not also offer a 
perspective on the outcome of Alice’s measurement? We need to understand why there are limits 
to the assessment of sentences such as (A) and how this places limits on scientific objectivity. 
 Thomas Nagel's (1986) famous metaphor of the view from nowhere suggests an ideal of 
objectivity according to which a thought or statement expresses an objective truth if and only if 
 
 12 
its truth depends only on how things are in the world and has nothing to do with any contexts in 
which it might be assessed as true or as false. Any statement that meets this ideal may be called 
transcendently objective. The paradox shows that a sentence like (A) about the outcome of a 
quantum measurement cannot be used to make a transcendently objective statement about the 
world—to state what Brukner (2018) called a fact of the world. It shows that there can be no 
transcendently objective facts about the outcomes of these quantum measurements. It shows that 
there are not even perspective-invariant facts about these outcomes, where a fact is perspective-
invariant if and only if it may be expressed by a statement that is true when assessed from every 
perspective. 
 Facts about the outcomes of quantum measurements in the paradoxical scenario are 
perspectival—what they are depends on the context of assessment because a statement assessed 
as true in one context cannot be assessed as true or as false in others. I caution against calling 
these “relative facts”, because to do so falsely suggests that a statement about the outcome of a 
quantum measurement may be assessed as true in one context but as false in another. Quantum 
theory involves no such truth-relativism. It is factuality, not truth-value, that is perspectival in the 
paradoxical scenario. The problem is to understand how this is possible. This is a problem 
because commonly held preconceptions apparently rule out any notion of a perspectival fact. 
Reflection on another case that presents limits to assessment may help to loosen their hold on the 
imagination. 
 Consider the sentence (H): It is 5 o’clock here. (H) is use-contextual: ‘here’ marks a 
spatial index and the present tense marks an implicit temporal index. But once these are fixed by 
specifying the time and place of use, (H) may seem assessable as true or false (in the actual 
world) independent of context. But, as Wittgenstein (1953, §350) recognized, a use of (H) on the 
sun has no readily assessable meaning or truth-condition on earth. The sun is in no terrestrial 
time-zone, terrestrial clocks cannot exist on the sun, and assessment of (H) at a terrestrial time 
and place presupposes a non-relativistic notion of absolute simultaneity. Whether (H) is 
assessable at a terrestrial time and location is contingent on the availability of a physics capable 
of jointly modeling the sun and earth within a unified (spatiotemporal) framework. Both 
Newtonian and relativistic physical theories provide such a framework, though relativity leaves 
some latitude in how to model distant simultaneity. Our physics provides a theoretical framework 
that may be used to render (H) assessable here and now on earth. 
 But what physics provides it can also take away. Although we have reason to believe it 
does not represent the structure of our actual universe, Gödel’s (1949) model of general relativity 
illustrates this possibility. In this model there are closed timelike curves: indeed, any two points 
of the spacetime lie on such curve. Each event occurs both before and after itself in the time 
ordering provided by a closed timelike curve on which it lies. There is no cosmic time in the 
Gödel universe so it is impossible to introduce a corresponding notion of distant simultaneity, 
however arbitrary. There is no way of assessing the truth-value of “It is 5 o’clock here” as used at 
some point in the Gödel universe from any other point. The sentence (H) could not be used to 
state a transcendently objective or even perspective-invariant fact in the Gödel universe. 
 Quantum theory now has an unbroken record of successful applications for close to a 
century. It has been successfully applied in the realm of the very large as well as the very small, 
over a huge range of energies, and to both simple and increasingly complex systems. It is 
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appropriate to let our intuitions be guided by these successful applications when considering the 
limits on the assessment of sentences that may be used to state their results, including the 
outcomes of quantum measurements. 
 Applications of the Born rule are restricted to what are called compatible properties of a 
system—properties that quantum theory associates with non-commuting projection operators. A 
variety of “no-go” results rule out any extension to an assignment of joint probabilities to 
incompatible properties. If we are to be guided by our best physical theories, we should conclude 
that sentences ascribing incompatible properties to a system cannot be assessed as true or as false 
together. This is a significant restriction on contexts of assessment. It is met by sentences used to 
assert the outcome of a quantum measurement that includes joint observation of a set of 
properties of a system, since such properties are observable together only if they are compatible. 
But such sentences may also be jointly assessed in contexts in which no experimenter performs a 
quantum measurement. They may be jointly assessed in any M-decoherence environment in 
which distinct M-values uniquely correspond to possession of contrary corresponding properties. 
Since no application of quantum theory requires or permits joint assessment outside of such an 
M-decoherence environment we should be guided by the theory in refusing to countenance any 
other contexts of assessment for sentences ascribing properties to quantum systems, including 
properties that ascribe a precise value to an M-magnitude. 
 
6. Facts and the Limits of Truth 
Facts and truth are two sides of a coin. When Alice utters (A) after measuring her particle’s z-
spin she thereby takes herself to make a true statement. It is hard to think of clearer examples of 
statements of fact than scientists’ reports of the results of their own observations (which does not 
mean every such sincere report is true—science builds on fallible foundations). To break out of 
the tight circle connecting truth and fact it is tempting to seek an analysis, of one notion or the 
other. But for a pragmatist there is a prior question: What is the point of these notions? Why do 
we have such notions in the first place? What good are they, and why can't we do without them?  
 In his (1988) book Price argues against the analytic approach to the concept of a 
statement of fact in the first part while offering an explanation of why we have the notion of truth 
in the second. The explanation helps one to understand not only why the notion of truth is 
important in many domains of thought but also why there are limits to its applicability. It thereby 
helps one to appreciate the limits of the notion of an objective fact, and so the limits of 
objectivity itself. 
 In a deflationary view, the notion of truth has only a kind of book-keeping function. But 
while endorsing the deflationary idea that truth is not a substantial property, Price (1988) takes 
the notion of truth also to play a more socially significant normative role. By acknowledging 
truth as a norm of discourse, members of a speech community are motivated to engage in the 
kind of reasoned argument among members whose mental states initially differ that tends to align 
their respective mental states to the benefit of all. Such benefits accrue when these mental states 
have what Price calls the Same Boat Property (SBP): 
 “A class of mental states have the SBP if their typical behavioral consequences are such that 
their behavioral appropriateness, or utility, is predominantly similar across a speech community. 
If a mental state has the SBP, then if it is appropriate for any one of us, it is appropriate for all–
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we are all in the same boat.”  Price (1988, p.152) 
 It will be necessary to generalize the SBP so that it concerns the mental states of a wider 
collection of agents than those composing a single speech community. Here is the Generalized 
Same Boat Property (GSBP): 
A class of mental states have the GSBP if their typical behavioral consequences are such that 
their behavioral appropriateness, or utility, is predominantly similar across a collection of 
agents. If a mental state has the GSBP, then if it is appropriate for any agent in the collection, it 
is appropriate for all-they are all in the same boat. 
A collection of agents may be partitioned into speech communities that are mutually isolated 
since for some reason members of different communities are unable to communicate with each 
other. Despite externalist concerns, there may still be a class of mental states with the GSBP in 
such a collection of agents. But as long as the communities remain mutually isolated there is no 
possibility of an exchange of views between members of different communities permitting 
alignment of their respective mental states to the benefit of all. The norm of truth can fulfill its 
social function within each speech community, but not across the lines separating communities. 
 There may be fundamental physical barriers to communication. Even if there are speech 
communities over our cosmic event horizon we will never be able to communicate with them. 
There can be no communication between scientists in different isolated laboratories in the 
scenario of §2.3. In each case we have a collection of agents segmented into physically and 
therefore socially isolated speech communities. So we might expect difficulties in applying a 
universal notion of truth to their statements, and corresponding limitations on the objectivity of 
facts. But there is an important difference between the two cases. 
 Current general relativistic models of the large scale structure of the universe give sense 
to assessment here and now of sentences about when an event occurred over or across our cosmic 
horizon, by incorporating a global cosmic time that crosses the horizon and thereby establishes a 
theoretical connection between events on opposite sides. Locating these events within a single 
theoretical model makes it significant and sometimes possible to assign a truth-value to other 
sentences also. Our best theories tell us that the cosmic microwave background radiation over our 
cosmic event horizon very closely approximates the same spectrum of black body radiation, that 
space-time still has a metric satisfying Einstein's field equations, that there are galaxies of stars, 
and so on. Our justified confidence in our best theories dictates belief that there are non-
perspectival facts about events over our cosmic event horizon just as it dictates belief in the 
existence of that horizon. 
 Contrast this with the paradoxical scenario of §2.3. In this case our best theory (quantum 
theory) connects contexts of assessment only if the theory may be applied in a compatible 
extension of all those contexts. For example, (A) may be assessed in EB and (B) in EA only 
because EAB compatibly extends each of EA, EB. After Eugene’s measurement there is no context 
in which (A) and (B) may be assessed together. Alice and Bob can never share the outcomes of 
their experiments in this scenario. Immediately after performing their experiments these are at 
spacelike separation: later they are effectively erased by Eugene’s measurement. But this does 
not prevent the application of quantum theory in EAB that requires joint assessment of (A), (B) in 
that context even though no single experimenter can verify both outcomes. Alice’s verification of 
the truth-value of (A) in EA thereby verifies it also in EAB: but neither Alice, Bob nor anyone else 
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can verify a truth-value assignment to both (A) and (B) in EAB , even though the applicability of 
quantum theory requires their joint assessability in that context. 
 In a standard experiment in which violations of Bell inequalities are verified or exploited, 
the outcomes of measurements at different locations can be shared later because their 
decoherence environments do not remain isolated but fuse into a single subsequent decoherence 
environment. In that fused environment many experimenters can verify the outcomes of all these 
measurements as recorded by the values of magnitudes that correspond to distinct elements of 
relevant “pointer bases”. We have confidence in the application of quantum theory to spatially 
separated measurements on entangled systems only because very many such verifications on a 
wide variety of systems assigned entangled quantum states have yielded statistics confirming 
joint probabilities predicted by the Born rule.  
 The features of the paradoxical scenario that distinguish it from a standard experiment 
verifying or exploiting non-classical patterns of correlation would also make it extraordinarily 
difficult to realize in an actual experiment. Preparing the entangled GHZ state would be difficult, 
but not beyond present technical capabilities: similar entangled states of three photons have been 
used to realize scenarios analogous to that of §2.2 (Pan et al. 2000). While each individual 
measurement by Alice, Bob or Charlie would not be hard to realize, it would be a challenge to 
ensure that the measurements of any two of them occur at spacelike separation. But there are two 
reasons why the paradoxical thought-experiment of §2.3 is so far beyond the bounds of 
practicality that neither we nor any other community of agents will ever be able actually to 
perform it. 
 The first reason is that it is and seems likely always to remain far beyond our technical 
capabilities to perform any of the individual measurements by Eugene, Johnnie and Daniel. It is 
easy formally to write down a unitary transformation that would model the interaction Eugene 
(for example) would have to apply to measure XA on Alice’s laboratory L together with the spin 
½ atom she has measured. But the operations needed to implement this interaction would need to 
be applied not just to the large scale features of Alice's lab but precisely and in a very specific 
way at the level of all its microscopic constituents, including the atoms and ions composing the 
bodies of its occupants. It is hard to imagine how any agent could ever perform these operations. 
If performed, they would effectively remove any record of the actual outcome of Alice’s 
measurement: if Eugene were to observe L immediately after he would be equally likely to find 
multiple concordant apparent “records” of a spin up outcome and a spin down outcome, whatever 
Alice had actually found. A recent paper (Aaronson, Atia and Susskind, 2020) shows that this is 
a generic feature of measurements sensitive to such macroscopic superpositions. 
 The second and more fundamental reason why the scenario of §2.3 will remain only a 
thought-experiment has to do with the assumption of physical isolation. The scenario assumed 
that a system could be isolated from the decohering effect of its external environment, in which 
case its environment corresponds to its own internal decoherence. But decoherence spreads 
extraordinarily widely extremely fast. Even in interstellar space a lab could not be isolated from 
the decohering influence of its external environment, including starlight and the all-pervasive 2.7 
degree Kelvin microwave background radiation. 
 This second reason has implications for the objectivity of measurement outcomes. The 
practical impossibility of confining decoherence within any lab implies that experimenters are in 
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practice always in the same boat: their mental states concerning outcomes of their respective 
quantum measurements have the GSBP no matter how hard they may try to isolate their separate 
labs from one another. Insofar as it is only physically localized agents that can perform quantum 
measurements, it is not just we humans that are inevitably always in the same boat: so would be 
any aliens, androids, etc. that may come to form part of our speech community or with whom we 
might share any kind of information. We all share a single decoherence environment and so we 
can reasonably expect to be able to reach agreement on the outcomes of any quantum 
measurements that can ever actually be performed. A notion of truth suitable for any actual 
community is universal enough, and yields all the objectivity we need as scientists and can hope 
for as people. 
 
7. Scientific Objectivity Reassessed and Reasserted 
The paradoxical scenario of §2.3 exhibits limits to truth and factuality, and thereby threatens the 
objectivity of science. There can be no transcendently objective facts about the outcomes of the 
quantum measurements that figure in that scenario. But since realizing that scenario is far beyond 
our current abilities it is not obvious what this implies about the kind of objectivity that matters 
for science. To address this question, recall a feature of the paradoxical scenario that puts its 
realization so far beyond our abilities. 
  No system or laboratory can be completely isolated from the effects of environmental 
interactions associated with decoherence of its quantum state. It is decoherence of the right sort 
that makes quantum measurements possible. But even very weak and ineliminable interactions 
between a laboratory and its external environment would combine with the interaction needed to 
measure an X-magnitude involving that laboratory so as to effectively decohere its state in a 
model and thereby destroy a delicate correlation like u.v.w. = -1 that led to the paradox. To put it 
metaphorically, the paradoxical scenario will forever remain merely a thought-experiment 
because realizing it would require an impossible combination of the absence of decoherence 
external to each laboratory with the presence of just the right kind of decoherence of apparatus 
and recording states within that laboratory. This is not just an impossible combination for human 
scientists to create: it is beyond the powers of any system complex enough to constitute an agent 
capable of performing a quantum measurement as a subsystem of a “laboratory system”. So no 
intelligent alien, android, or quantum computer running an advanced AI program could realize 
the paradoxical scenario. It is not just our science whose objectivity is not threatened by the 
paradox. 
 In the view from nowhere, the measurements of Alice, Bob, Charlie, Eugene, Johnny and 
Daniel could not all have had unique outcomes. But transcendent objectivity is a metaphysical 
ideal, not a presupposition of successful science. Although its content may be diminished, a 
claim about the outcome of a single or joint measurement by the agents in the scenario described 
in §2.3 is still objective in several senses. First, statements about measurement outcomes are not 
subjective: they are not about, and not relative to, the epistemic state or consciousness of the one 
who makes them. Secondly, any agent who has accepted quantum theory can adopt the 
perspective of any of Alice, Bob or their friends in the thought-experiment and understand, use 
and (hypothetically) assess the truth-value of statements about the outcome of a measurement 
from that perspective. Third, and most importantly, there are no completely isolated labs, and 
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even if there were there is no conceivable practical way of performing the interactions needed to 
implement an X-measurement on such a lab and its contents. In all practically realizable 
situations scientists and all other agents now, and always will, share a single perspective because 
they inhabit a single environmental context. 
 This third sense is worth a name of its own. I shall call a statement immanently objective 
if it expresses a truth in all actual contexts of assessment. The measurement outcomes in the 
scenario of §2.3 would not be even immanently objective: Alice's statement of her measurement 
outcome would be evaluated as true in her environment but not in Eugene's, for example. But the 
thought-experiment cannot be performed because quantum decoherence is pervasive in the only 
environment actually shared by all agents. This provides the only actual context of assessment for 
statements about the outcomes of quantum measurements. So these are all immanently objective.
 So far I have focused on the objectivity of measurement outcomes. But what I have said 
applies much more widely. Most if not all statements about the physical world may be recast as 
statements about the values of magnitudes. These include not only statements about settings of 
switches and knobs on experimental equipment and currents in coils, but also statements about 
the behavior of a mouse, the height of a plant, the structure of an FMRI image, and even where 
things are in and outside the lab. For one who accepts quantum theory, all such statements are 
just as objective as science needs them to be, even though no statement about the value of a 
magnitude is transcendently objective. For all these statements, the conceptual distinction 
between transcendent and immanent objectivity has no conceivable practical scientific 
significance, though it is of great philosophical interest. 
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